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ABSTRACT
There is one central fact about the economic history of the twentieth century: above all, the
century just past has been the century of increasing material wealth and economic productivity. No
previous era and no previous economy has seen material wealth and productive potential grow at
such a pace. The bulk of America's population today achieves standards of material comfort and
capabilities that were beyond the reach of even the richest of previous centuries. Even lower middle-
class households in relatively poor countries have today material standards of living that would make
them, in many respects, the envy of the powerful and lordly of past centuries.
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Cornucopia:The Pace of Economic
Growth in the Twentieth Century
A. Increasing wealth
Thistwentieth century has been above all the century of increasing wealth.
No previous era we know of has seen anything like the proportional growth in material,
economic wealth--in the productivity of workers and the standards of living of consumers-
-that the twentieth century saw in the industrialized democracies that make up the core of
the world economy. No previous era and no previous economy has seen anything like the
level of material wealth and productive potential attained by the twentieth centur)?s
2
economy.
Today the average American possesses a degree of material comfort that in many ways
outstrips the reach of even the richest humans of previous centuries.2 Perhaps a billion2, Cornucopia 3
people living today are within striking distance of middle-class American productivity
levels and living standards. Moreover, even lower middle-class households in relatively
poor countries have material standards of living that in many dimensions--access to
entertainment and news, public health, variety and extent of diet, potential literacy,
materials with which to build shelter--would make them the envy of many of the
prosperous of past centuries.
Perhaps the best indicator of the extraordinary level and rate of advance of material well-
being and productive potential is that we take it for granted. If in the eighteenth century
people began to think of the idea of progress,3 and in the nineteenth there actually began
to be visible progress,4 in the twentieth century we expected and today we expect
progress. We assume that each generation will live between half again and twice as well in
material terms as its parent generation.5 We find it hard to imagine what it would be like to
2Could the EmperorTiberius have eaten fresh grapes in Januaiy? Could the Emperor Napoleon have
crossed theAtlanticin a night, or gottenfromParis to London in two hours? CouldThomasAquinas have
writtena 2000-word letterintwohours—andthendispatchedit off to 1,000recipientswith the touch of a
key, and begun toreceivereplies within thehour? Computers,automobiles, airplanes, VCR' s,washing
machines,vacuum cleaners,telephones,and other technologies—combined with mass production—give
middle-class citizens ofthe UnitedStatestoday degrees ofmaterialwealth—controlover commodities,
and the ability to consume services—that previous generations could barely imagine.
SeeMarieJean Antoine Nicolas Caritat,Marquisde Condorcet (1793), Esquisse d'un Tableau
1-fistorique des Progrés de l'Esprit Humain (Paris: Masson et Fils).
Although not clearly so until after the so-called "Hungry [Eighteen-]Fourties." John Stuart Mill could
write at almost the midpoint of the nineteenth century that it was doubtful that progress had lightened the
burden of toil on humanity; Thomas Carlyle could christen economics the "dismal science" for its
predictions that progress would not lighten the burden of toil on humanity. See George Boyer (1998),
"The Historical Background of the Communist Manifesto," Journal of Economic Perspectives ; Thomas
Carlyle (1850), Latter-Day Pamphlets
http://Dromo.netJpgj authors/carlyle thomas .html#latterdaynamphlets, downloaded January 31, 2000;
John Stuart Mill (1848), Principles of Political Economy, with Some Applications to Social Philosophy
http://socserv2. socsci.mcmaster.cal—.econJugcmJ3ll3/mjll/pripJ downloaded January 31, 2000.2. Cornucopia 4
live in a society not experiencing rapid material progress, And the gulf in material
standards of living between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twentieth centuiy is so large that it is hard for us to grasp how large a gulf there is
between how we lived and how people lived in previous centuries.6
1.Montgomery Ward's prices
Oneplace to begin to begin to measure the gulf is the 1895 Montgomery Ward catalog. At
the turn of the last century, Montgomery Ward was the largest mail-order retailer in the
And a slowdown in economic groMh--like the productivity slowdown the U.S. and the rest of the
industrialized world experienced between 1973 and 1995--is cause for alarm and a force that shakes
political foundations. See Robert Reich (1992), The Work of Nations (New York: Vintage: 0679736158).
6 Oneattempt to capture the difference is made by the science-fiction writer Walter John Williams in his
novel Aristol. His viewpoint characters come across a planet that has deliberately been kept in ignorance
of industrial and post-industrial technology as part of a metaphilosophical experiment, and they react with
horror:
most work seemed to be done by brutehumanmuscle power alone Primitive firearms
existed in large numbers--cannons were picked out on the ramparts of castles and star-
forts..,
open sewers down the middle of every street and open cesspits everywhere...
existence, even for the better-off, more than justified Thomas Hobbess remarks on life
being nasty, brutish, and short. Heads were observed stuck on pikes above city gates;
bodies that showed signs of pitiless torture swung in cages over city streets. Filthy
children slept in gutters while disinterested oligarchs in their finery were carried in
chairs over the starving bodies... In the country, wandering families of laborers and
gleaners slept under haystacks while those with property largely slept with their
animals. Famine seemed fairly commonplace—banditry, much of it under the guise of
warfare, even more so...
The cumulative impact of the probes' images staggered the Cressida's crew.... Clancy
took refuge in unremitting fury.
"Sadist, did I say?" she said. "De Sade was a piker by comparison! Hitler was a trifle
maladjusted, Stalin a blunderer, and Chingiz Khan a mere amateur!"
See Walter John Williams (1992), Aristol (New York: Tor: 0812514092).2. Cornucopia
United States. It supplied rural and small-town households around the country with goods
produced in America's factories. It was one of the few ways the forty percent of
Americans living in small towns or on the farm could buy the products of modern industry.
The regular arrival of the mail-order catalogues, followed by goods shipped from
centralized warehouses proved a boon to rural consumers and a comfortable market niche
for companies like Montgomery Ward, willing to supply goods ranging from sterling silver
teaspoons to sets of the Encyclopedia Britannica to drill presses.
Multiplicationof Productivity 1895-2000
Time Needed for an Average Worker to Earn the Purchase Price of Various Commodities
Commodity Time-to-Earn in Time-to-Earn in
1895 (Hours) 2000 (Hours)
Productivity
Multiple
Horatio Alger (6 vols.) 21 0.6 35.0
One-speed bicycle 260 7.2 36.1
Cushioned office chair 24 2.0 12.0
100-piecedinnerset 44 3.6 12.2
Hair brush 16 2.0 8.0
Cane rocking chair 8 1.6 5.0
Solid gold locket 28 6.0 4.7
Encyclopedia Britannica 140 33.8 4.1
Steinway piano 2400 1107.6 2.2
Sterling silver teaspoon 26 34.0 0.8
Source: 1895 Montgomery Ward Catalogue7
I895 Montgomery Ward Catalogue, intro. By Boris Emmett (New York: Dover Books, 1969 facsimile
edition: 0486223779). I was made aware of the Montgomery Ward Catalogue as a source by William
Baumol, Sue Anne Batey Blackman, and Edward Wolff (1989) Productivity andAmeri can Leadership:
The Long View (Cambridge: MIT Press: 0262521636), which contains a nice discussion of productivity
growth throughthis particularlens. Boris Emmett's introduction to the facsimile edition of the Catalogue
is verywelldone. Also very well done is W. Michael Cox andRichardAIm (1997),TimeWell Spent
(Dallas: Federal ReserveBankof Dallas).2. Cornucopia 6
Comparing the prices charged in the Montgomery Ward catalog with prices today--both
expressed as a multiple of the average hourly wage--provides an index of how much our
productivity in making the goods consumed back in 1895 has multiplied.
Consider a one-speed bicycle, costing $65 if ordered from Montgomery Ward in 1895.
The price of a bicycle measured in "nominal" dollars has more than doubled over the past
century (as a result of inflation). But the bicycle today is much less expensive in terms of
the only measure that truly counts, its "real" price: the work and sweat needed to earn its
cost. It took perhaps 260 hours' worth of the average American worker's production in
1895 to mount up to enough money to buy a one-speed bicycle. Today a bicycle--the
high-tech cutting-edge consumer good of 1895--costs 1/36 as much in labor time today as
it did back then. On the bicycle standard—measuring wealth by counting up how many
bicycles it can buy—the average American worker today is some 36 times richer than his
or her counterpart was back in 1895.
Other commodities tell their--different--stories. A six-volume set of (cheaply made) novels
by Horatio Alger costs 1/35 as much in this labor-wage-metric now as it did a century
ago. A 100-piece dinner set from Crate and Barrel today costs 1/12 as much in labor time
as a set from Montgomery Ward used to. A. cushioned office chair has become 12 1/2
times cheaper.
But there are other goods with less of a productivity multiple: a multiple of less than 5 for
a solid gold locket, a productivity multiple of only a little more than two for a Steinway
piano, and a productivity multiple of 0.8 for a sterling silver teaspoon: it costs more hours
to earn the money to buy a silver teaspoon (mail order from Ross Simons) today than it2. Cornucopia 7
took back in 1895.8 There are some commodities for which our productive potential has
not increased over the past century.
Caveats
Or has it? A farm household ordering a few silver implements back in 1895 was
presumably seeking flatware that would not corrode rapidly. They did not know how to
mix chromium atoms with iron and carbon atoms to make corrosion-resistant flatware. We
do. Thus our everyday utensils are made of stainless steel: our silver is reserved for when
(and who) wants to set a glittering table. Is the right comparison to make that of the price
of a sterling silver teaspoon then with a sterling silver teaspoon now, or of a silver
teaspoon then with a stainless steel teaspoon now? It matters a lot. For those who think
that the important characteristic is that it is made up of silver, it is indeed 25 percent more
expensive now than it was back then when you could pick the silver up off of the ground
in Nevada. But for those who think that the important characteristics is that it does not
rust, a teaspoon today costs only one-fiftieth as much in terms of labor time as it did a
century ago.
Or consider the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Today its print version costs $ 1,250--in labor
hours one quarter as much as it cost back in 1895. But the Encyclopaedia Britannica CD
2000 costs $49.95--a drop in labor-time price of a factor of 100, if the CD is taken as an
8
Seehttp://www.ross-simons.coniJ2. Cornucopia 8
equivalent product. And the Concise Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia can be accessed
over the internet for free.9
Even comparing commodities made in 1895 with the like commodities made today is not
quite straightforward.
[Picture: commodities in the table above]
The Index Number Problem
The answer to the question "how much wealthier are we today than our counterparts of a
centuiy ago?" depends on which set of commodities you view as central and important. If
you care only about personal services—having a butler around to answer the door and
polish your silver spoons—then you would find little difference in national average wealth
between 1895 and 1990: an hour of a butler's time then cost about an hour's worth of the
time of an average worker; an hour of a butler's time today costs about thesame; on the
butler-hiring standard we are no richer off than a century ago. But suppose you care a lot,
instead, about your ability to by mass-produced manufactured goods—like bicycles. Then
the multiple is 36.
Sec htty:t/www.encycloyedia.coniJ. Most more comprehensive encyclopedias--including Britannica--
chargeabout $5 a monthforaccess to their online editions.2. Cornucopia 9
This divergence is the index-number problem.'° It is ultimately unresolvable:" there is no
single, unique, correct index that will tell you how much higher wealth of productivity is:
it all depends on what you value, and what set of weights you choose to evaluate the
different production possibilities of different eras. Thus it depends in a veiy real sense on
just who you are. If your tastes, needs, and desires are different, the appropriate measure
of economic growth will be different too.
2.Long-Run Estimates of GDP per Worker
Neverthelessthe government arrives at a single, consensus, official or semi-official
estimate of the pace of long run economic growth. It publishes the time series of real (that
is, inflation-adjusted) GDP--gross domestic product--in Historical Statistics of the United
States.'2 You can construct a picture of long-run economic growth by taking the time
series for real GDP from Historical Statistics, splicing the series onto contemporary
estimates of current GDP, and then divide GDP by the number of workers in the American
10
See,for example, R.G.D. Allen (1975), Index Numbers in Theory and Practice (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company: 0202060713). The classic source is Irving Fisher (1922), The Making of Index
Numbers (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin: 1851962328).
'Economic research has focused on doing as well as possible: constructing so-called "superlative" index
numbers that are extremely close local approximations to a true cost-of-living or quantity-of-valued-output
index. See WE. Diewert (1976), "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers," Journal of Econometrics 4:2
(May), pp. 115-45. But a good local approximation is not much use when one is concerned about global
changes, and when a key source of uncertainty is the question of exactly whose utility one is trying to
measure.
12
(1997)Historical Statistics of the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:
0521585414). How created. Forthcoming millennial revision. Carter and Sutch.2. Cornucopia 10
economy to arrive at an estimate of how the economy's per-worker productive potential
has changed over time.'3
What is this "GDP" that is the standard measure of economic output? Annual GDP is a
measure of all the final goods and services produced in a country in a year. It includes all
those consumption goods and services produced--those bought by households for their
own use. It includes all investment goods purchased by businesses to expand their stocks
of productive capital.'4 And it includes goods and services purchased by the government,
and used by the government to accomplish its tasks.
"Why the focus on "per worker"? Because GDP is a measure only of economic activity that passes
through the market. As the share of the American adult population in the paid labor force has risen, so
measured GD? has risen, even though part of what has been going on has been the shifting boundaiy
between categories of work that used to be outside, but are now inside the market. So divide real GDP by
the size of the American laborforce (notby the population) to attempt to control for the shifting boundaiy
between market and non-market work, and still arrive at a measure of material well-being and prosperity. 'Notethat GDP includes not just the production of investment goods that add to businesses' stocks of
productive capital, but also the production of investment goods that replace worn-out or obsolete pieces of
capital as well. This is a conceptual flaw: a better measure would be netdomesticproduct, which is equal
to GDP minus those investments that simply replace already-existing pieces of capital that are retired
from production. But the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis has no confidence in its
ability to estimate capital consumption, and prefers to focus on a statistic--GDP--that it can estimate with
more confidence. The BEA thinks that ND? is something like 11 percent less than GDP.2. Cornucopia 11
As of the end of 1999, forecasts of U.S. GDP in 2000 put it at $9,300 billion, which with
142 million workers (employed plus unemployed) comes to an annual real GDPper
worker (measured in dollars of the year 2000's purchasing power) of $65,540. Back in
1890, a little more than a century ago, the spliced-together time series from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis tells us that GDIP in 1890 (at the year 2000's prices) was $300 billion.
With an 1890 labor force of 21.8 million that translates into an annual real GDPper
worker in 1890 of $13,700.
The semi-official time series tells us that material standard of living and potential economic
productivity at the start of the third millennium was nearly five times what it had been only
$70,000
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110 years before: a rate of per-worker real economic growth of 1.4 percent per year. And
if we adjusted for the decline in the working year since 1890, we would find a six to
sevenfold increase in measured per-work hour real GD?. According to these estimates, an
American household with six times the median family income back in 1890--a household
as wealthy and as high up in the relative income distribution then as a household with an
income of $300,000 today--was no better off in measured material welfare than the
average American household today.
Note that this broad upward sweep in measured output per worker is the central feature of
the figure above. On this scale, the business cycle-centered concerns of newspaper
financial pages are barely visible.'5 The recessions and depressions and the transitory
booms that make headlines are by and large hard to see. The 1970 and 1991 recessions are
small ripples. The 1974 oil shock and the 1982 inflation reduction depressions are small
notches. They had little effect on the volume of production. They are only minor
interruptions in its upward march.'6
There is one exception. Between 1929 and 1950 the U.S. undergoes the Great
Depression, the immense boom of World War II, and then the process of reconversion
from the total war economy of 1942-1945 to a peacetime economy. %he Great
Depression of 1929-194 1 temporarily annihilated a generation's growth in incomes. It saw
'
Savefor the Great Depression, which alone is of large enough scale to be clearly visible as a major
feature of the record of twentieth century GDP per worker growth. Caution that the welfare costs of
business cycles are (perhaps) at least an order of magnitude larger than their costs in terms of outputper
worker. Cite to David Romer 0, Advanced Macroeconomics ().Citeto Rebecca Blank and Alan Blinder.
6Recessionsare in fact not feared because they significantly reduce the volume of production. They are
feared because of the distribution of the losses that they create. Most people are unaffected, butmany the
people lose their jobs and nearly all their income, and a few of the rich lose nearly all their wealth. It is
this fear that you will be one of the unlucky whom a recession hits terribly hard that accounts for much of
the salience of recessions in American minds.2. Cornucopia 13
unemployment peak at a quarter of the labor force. Unemployment remained above ten
percent and production per worker remained below its 1929 level, until the beginning of
World War II. The Great Depression provoked fears that the run of economic growth that
had commenced with the industrial revolution had played itself out, and that "secular
stagnation" had set in.'7 But the Great Depression was unique. It has not been repeated. 18
Neitherhas the extraordinary military mobilization of World War II.
Moreover, this upward jump of productivity and wealth has not been confmed to the
world economy's industrial core. Even as early as 1987, 97 percent of households in
Greece--not usually considered one of the world's industrial leaders--owned a television
set. In Mexico in that same year there was one automobile for every sixteen people, one
television for every eight, one telephone for every ten.'9
Thus Historical Statistics produces an estimate of the multiplication of economic wealth
over the past century in the range given by the prices in the century-old Montgomery
Ward Catalogue. A six to seven-fold multiplication is more than our increasingpower to
make some of the commodities listed (Steinways, solid-gold lockets) and less than our
increasing power to make other commodities (bicycles, chairs, and books).
See Alvin Hansen o.
IS Atleast it has not yet been repeated. But the economic stagnation of Japan in the wake of the late-i 980s
collapse of its "bubble economy" is rapidly approaching Depression size in terms of lost production and
foregone economic growth. The current majority opinion is that the Great Depression required that
uniquely large shocks hit the global economy at a time of uniquely great structural vulnerability. Hence
many people are willing to bet real money that the Great Depression will not be repeated. See Peter Temin
O Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge: MIT Press); Barry Eichengreen (1997), Globalizing
Capital 0; Christina Romer (1999), "Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations," Journal
of Economic Perspectives o.
19 (1990),The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics (New York: Times Books: 0812918770).2. Cornucopia 14
3.Alternative Answers
Butthe set of calculations underlying the numbers reported in Historical Statistics are
only one way of calculating increasing wealth. The time series of Historical Statistics is,
mostly and roughly, what economists call a Laspeyres index.20 It corresponds to a certain
conceptual experiment. Suppose that we took a representative sample everything
produced in some year in the past, stuffed it into a time machine, moved it forward to
today, and sold it; how much would it be worth? That is what the "2000 prices" in the
statement "GD? per worker in 1890 was some $13,700 a year at 2000 prices" means. And
the resulting estimate of long-run economic growth compares the value at today's prices--
$ 13,700--of the commodities produced by an average worker then to the value at today's
prices--$65,000--of the commodities produced by an average worker today.
A little thought will convince you that this is a significant understatement of the extent and
magnitude of economic growth. When we hear that "average GDP per worker in 1890
was equal to $13,700 at 2000 prices," we think that the material standard of living then
was about what we could obtain now if we had $13,700 to spend to support us for a year.
But that is not the case: the material standard of living then was roughly what we could
obtain now if we had $13,700 to spend, and were required to spend it all on commodities
that have been around for more than a century. People then could buy wrought-iron
fences, bicycles, books by Horatio Alger, cushioned chairs, flour meat, and a primitive
telephone. They could not buy modem entertainment or communications or transportation
20
Laspeyresindex footnote.2. Cornucopia 15
technologies, no modem appliances, no modem buildings, no antibiotics, no air travel. An
income of $13,700 today that must be spent exclusively on commodities already in use in
the late nineteenth century is, for all of us, worth a lot less than $13,700.
The argument that our commodity-focused price indices miss most of the real action—that
price indices focusing on the servicesprovidedwould produce vastly greater estimates of
long-run economic growth—is made most powerifilly by William Nordhaus in his study of
the economic cost of light.2' Nordhaus attempts to construct a consistent series of the real
labor-time cost of illumination from the dawn of civilization until today. He concludes that
the past hundred years have seen a ten thousand-fold decline in the real price of
illumination. Yet commodity-based price indices have only captured a ten-fold decline in
this real price.
21 William Nordhaus (1997) "Do RealOutput and Real Wage Measures Capture Reality?: the History of
Lighting Suggests Not," in Timothy Bresnahan and Daniel Ra11 eds., The Economics of New Goods
(Chicago: University of Chicago), pp. 29-66. Also worth reading is the insightful comment by Charles
Hulten, pp. 66-70. For a somewhat different methodology—an attempt to calculate the total consumer
surplus generated from a single innovation, the CAT scanner—see Manuel Trajtenberg (1990), Economic
Analysis of Product Innovation: The Case of CT Scanners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press:
0674225406).2. Cornucopia 16
Nordhaus guesses that the Historical Statistics estimates of economic growth have
understated true economic growth since 1800 by between 0.5% and 1.4% per year—an
amount that cumulates to a multiplicative factor of between 3 and 15 over the past to
centuries, and to a conclusion that real wages since 1900 have multiplied by a factor
between 20 and 100.
Inventions largely commercialized and diffused in this century include late-nineteenth
century inventions like the monorail, the telephone, the microphone, the cash register, the
phonograph, the incandescent lamp, explosives, the electric train, linotype printing, the
steam turbine, the gasoline engine, the streetcar, movies, motorcycles, automobiles,
concrete-and-steel construction, electric appliances of all kinds, inflatable tires, radio,












aspirin, x-rays, taxicab meter. Twentieth-century inventions include the espresso machine,
plastics, airplanes, helicopters, hydrofoils, the zipper, the traffic light, heat-resistant glass,
television, bulldozers, antibiotics, highways, jet engines, radar, insulin, photocopiers,
nylon, transistors, integrated circuits, computers, fiber-optic cables, videotape, oral
contraceptives, lasers, CT scanners, catalytic converters, and genetic fingerprinting?2 A
rough cut is that roughly 45% of the value of what middle-class consumers in rich
industrial countries use at the start of the third millennium is in commodities that were not
invented or that were not in widespread use at all in the last years of the nineteenth
century.
[Figure: collage of commodities invented in the twentieth century]
Measuring economic growth as the Laspeyres index does means that we value goods
produced in the past at their current prices, and so understates economic growth as it
produces an estimate of a six to sevenfold improvement in material standards of living in
the past century. What if we were to turn it around, and calculate economic growth
valuing goods and services not at their prices as of 2000, but at their prices as of 1890?
The figure below shows one of the standard diagrams of introductory economics. Along
the horizontal axis of the diagram we plot the amount producedper worker of"old
fashioned" goods that were invented and were in use in 1890. Along the vertical axis of
the diagram we plot the amount produced per worker of "modem" goods. The point
labeled "then" shows what annual per-worker production was back then in 1890: $13,700
worth (at today's prices) of old-fashioned goods and $0 of modern goods. The point
22See SmithsonianHistorical Timeline of Inventions2. Cornucopia 18
labeled "nOW" shows what annual per-worker production is today: (roughly) $35,000
worth (at today's prices) of old-fashioned goods and (perhaps) $30,000 worth (at today's
prices) of modem goods.





Inthis oversimplified and stripped-down way of looking at it, production "then" and
production "now" are each two dimensional quantities: you simply cannot compare them--
say that one is X times larger than the other--without imposing more structure.2. Cornucopia 19




Oneway toproceed--theway that Historical Statistics more-or-less proceeds--is to use
the fact that $1 worth of modern goods buys $1 worth of old-fashioned goods today, and
to look not at the points showing what is actually produced but at all the possible
combinations of goods that could be purchased (at today's prices) with the income needed
to buy per-worker production either then or now. Draw, as in the figure above, the price
line showing how dollar-for-dollar one could at today's prices buy more of modem and
less of old-fashioned goods. Compare the positions of the lines that show the resulting sets
of available choices.
Because the two lines are parallel, the ratio of their relative distances from the bottom-left
corner shows the ratio of the today's-dollar value of production "now" to production
"then." This is what the Laspeyres index does: it uses the metric provided by today's
prices to make a single numerical comparison between the value of goods produced




But what if we took some other set of prices? Instead of taking a representative sample of
everything produced in 1890, stuffing it into a time machine, bringing it forward to today,
selling it; suppose we took a representative sample of everything produced today, stuffed
it into a time machine, took it back to 1890, and sold it then at the prices that then
prevailed?
Then we would have a very different answer, for a large chunk of what is produced now
was unavailable back in 1890. It has a very high--in many cases an infinite--price. Drawing
the 1890 price line showing the terms at which old-fashioned goods were then exchanged
for modem goods produces a nearly horizontal line. And the relative distance between the
two lines is very large, much larger than the six to sevenfold increase in output per work
hour calculated from Historical Statistics.
RelativeReal Productivity Levels: Using Past Prices
Modern
goods
ow Real productivity now
Real productivity then —0 .._____________________
Old-fashioned goods
Then2 Cornucopia 21
We would then conclude that, measured in the metric provided by prices in the past, that
economic growth over the past hundred years has been nearly infinite: even all of the
resources of the economy of the past would have been unable to produce even an
infinitesimal fraction of some of the goods we make today. We are nearly infinitely better
at producing the floating-point arithmetic operations, or airplane ifights, and antibiotics
that we take for granted--because they are so cheap--today.
4.Credible Answers
Aresuch large estimates of the rate of economic growth and improvement in material
welfare over the past century credible? The answer is both yes and no.
A credible answer to the question of how much material prosperity has multiplied over the
twentieth century might look like the answer to one of the following two thought
experiments:
• Take a household with income per capita today equal to the economy-wide average.
What multiple of average income per capita a century ago would be required for that
household to feel equally well-off in a material sense, if it were transported back in
time?
• Take a household with income per capita a century ago equal to the economy-wide
average then. What fraction of average income per capita today would be required for2. Cornucopia 22
that household to feel equally well-off in a material sense, if it were transported
forward in time?
However, these two questions will not have identical--or even close--answers. It is clear
that the answer to the first question suggests a very large increase in material prosperity
over the past century. Given the absence in 1890 of modern innoculations, modern
antibiotics, and other technologies of the past century, it is hard to argue that anything less
than an astronomical income back in 1890 could compensate. J.P. Morgan could not go to
the movies, or watch football on television. He has no VCR. To travel from New York to
Italy took a week, not a night. Was he better off in a material welfare sense than an
average inhabitant of the U.S. today? Perhaps, but it is not clear. The answer to the first
question is very large indeed.
Personally I have no problem at all with the first answers conclusion that Historical
Statistics vastly understates growth: my household's income today is roughly $200,000 a
year—about three times average GDP per worker. Suppose that you stuffed me and my
family into a time machine, sent us back a century to 1890, and then gave us an income
equal to eighteen times that of 1890 average GDP per worker—an income that would put
us at the same place in the relative income distribution then as some $1,200,000 a year
would today. We would not be among the 500 or so richest families in the country that
might be invited to the most exclusive parties in the mansions of Newport, Rhode Island;
but we would be among the next outer circle of 5,000 or so.
Would we be happy—or at least not unhappy—with the switch? Ourpower to purchase
some commodities would be vastly increased: we would have at least three live-in
servants, a fifteen-room house (plus a summer place). If we lived in San Francisco we2. Cornucopia 23
would live on Russian Hill, if we lived in Boston we would live on Beacon Hill. If we lived
in New York we would live on Park or Fifth Avenue.
But the answer is surely that we would not be happy. I would want, first, health insurance:
the ability to go to the doctor and be treated with late-twentieth-century medicines.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was crippled by polio. Nathan Meyer Rothschild—the richest
man in the world in the first half ofthe nineteenth century—died of an infected abscess.23
Without antibiotic and adrenaline shots I would now be dead of childhood pneumonia.
The second thing I would want would be utility hookups: electricity and gas, central
heating, and consumer appliances. The third thing I want to buy is access to information:
audio and video broadcasts, recorded music, computing power, and access to databases.
None of these were available at any price back in 1890.
I could substitute other purchases for some. I could not buy a washing machine, but I
could (and would) hire a live-in laundress to do the household's washing. I could not buy
airplane tickets; I could make sure that when I did travel by long distance train and boat I
could do so first class, so that even though travel churned up enormous amounts of time it
would be time spent relatively pleasantly. But I could do nothing for medical care. And I
could do nothing for access to information, communications, and entertainment
technology save to leave the children home with the servants and go to the opera and the
theater every other week. How much are the central heating, electric lights, fluoridated
23
SeeDavid S. Landes (1998), The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So
Poor (New York: W.W. Norton: 0393040178), citing Derek Wilson (1994), Rothschild A Story of Wealth
and Power (London: Mandarin).2. Cornucopia 24
toothpaste, electric toaster ovens, clothes-washing machines, dishwashers, synthetic fiber-
blend clothes, radios, intercontinental telephones, xerox machines, notebook computers,
automobiles, and steel-framed skyscrapers that I have used so far today worth—and it is
only 10 A.M.?
I would not be satisfied with my attempts to substitute using late nineteenth century
technology. First of all, I would be dead. Second a very large chunk of my-high-material
standard of living is the broad range of commodities newly-invented over the course of the
past century that I can choose to purchase, and that I do use because they give me
capabilities that were simply not possible a century ago.
By contrast, the answer to the second question suggests a smaller increase in material
prosperity--perhaps a factor often. Someone with an income of $5,000 a year in the U.S.'
today has much better access to medical care and mass entertainment than a middle-class
household of a century ago, and better transportation and clothing. He or she has better
winter vegetables, but perhaps a worse overall diet. And he or she has worse housing,
worse access to non mass-media forms of entertainment, and a much lower ability to
purchase goods that are currently fashionable. The comparison of the poor today with the
middle class of a century ago producesan estimate of the pace of economic growth not
too dissimilar from that produced by Historical Statistics. The comparison of the middle
class today with the rich of a century ago produces an estimate that is much much larger.24
So how much economic growth is worth to you depends on where you sit: for those near
the bottom of the income distribution in industrial economies growth looks much less
24 This difference should notsurprise us. Only ii consumption patterns are what economists call
homotheti c—only if a proportional increase in income leads to a proportional increase in the purchase of
all commodities—will the answers to these two thought-experiments be the same. There is no good reason
to believe in such homotheticity Homotheticity footnote.2. Cornucopia 25
impressive, in large part because many of the new commodities invented over the past
centuiy are of no use if you cannot afford them.
So do we shrug our shoulders and accept the Historical Statistics answer that we today
are eight times as rich as our counterparts of a century ago? (And that the gulf is larger if
we care about manufactured goods; and smaller if we care about personal services, and
some kinds of luxuries?) No, I do not think that we accept this answer, because the
Historical Statistics answer is the least of the possible answers we could arrive at: we
know that it provides a lower bound to "true" growth. It provides a lower bound because
the calculations that underlie it leave out the many things we make today that were not
made back in the 1890s.2. Cornucopia 26
If we must put forward one number, we will probably due the least damage to reality if we
take the Boskin Commissions guesstimate that unmeasured improvements in quality and
the invention of new goods and new types of goods have led standard measures to
understate true economic growth (from a first-world middle-class perspective at least) by
1% per year. Such an assumption leads to a conclusion that economic outputper worker
has multiplied sixteen-fold since 1890.
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5.The Limit of Human Felicity
However,in the end the quantitative estimates of the pace of economic growth--and the
wide range of such estimates generated by the unresolvable index number problem--is in
some ways less interesting than a picture of the qualitative difference twentieth century
economic growth makes. We can see the magnitude of the contribution that the changing
set of commodities we can produce makes to our wealth by reading Looking Backward,
Edward Bellamy's turn of the last century utopian novel.25 In Looking Backward the
narrator—thrown forward in time from 1895 to 2000—hears the question, "Would you
like to hear some music?"
He expects his host to play the piano—a social accomplishment of upper-class women
around 1900. To listen to music on demand then, you had to have—in your house or
nearby—an instrument, and someone trained to play it. It would have cost the average
worker some 2400 hours, roughly a year at a 50-hour workweek, to earn the money to
buy a high-quality piano, and then there would be the expense and the time committed to
piano lessons.
But today, to listen to music-on-demand in your home, all you need is a CD or a tape
player—or in a pinch, if you are willing to let others choose your music for you, a radio.
The labor-time value of a Steinway piano may have only halved when measured inaverage
worker-hours. But if what you value is not the piano itself but the capability of listening to
music at home, the cost has fallen from 2400 average worker-hours a centuryago to 10
25EdwardBellamy (1887), Looking Backward (New York: New American Library: 0451524128).
Paragraph on the importance of Looking Backward viewed in its context.2. Cornucopia 28
hours today (240 dollars for the boom-box plus 10 dollars for the CD). So when we
calculate the increase in material wealth, do we count the halving of the labor-time price of
the commodity (which is what Historical Statistics does); or do we count the 240-fold
decrease in the real labor-time price of the capability of listening to piano music? And
whose piano playing do you really want to listen to?
After answering "yes" to the question "would you like to hear some music?" Bellamy's
protagonist is stupefied to find his host "merely touched one or two screws," and
immediately the room was "filled with music; filled, not flooded, for, by some means, the
volume of melody had been perfectly graduated to the size of the apartment. 'Grand!' I
cried. 'Bach must be at the keys of that organ; but where is the organ?"
He learns that his host has called the orchestra on the telephone—for in Bellamy's utopia
you can dial one of four orchestras, and then put it on the speakerphone. Bellamy's
protagonist then says that:
if we [in the nineteenth century] could have devised an arrangement for providing
everybody with music in their homes, perfect in quality, unlimited in quantity,
suited to every mood, and beginning and ceasing at will, we should have
considered the limit of human felicity already attained.,.
To Edward Bellamy—a self-described utopian visionary, a late-nineteenth century
minister's son from western Massachusetts—a radio that could tune intoany of four
stations is "the limit of human felicity..." What if someone were to take Edward Bellamy
to Tower Records? Or Blockbuster Video? His heart would stop. Yet we do not think of
our modern ability to cheaply listen to high-fidelity go-anywhere listen-to-anything music
as a remarkable or even a notable part of our economy. We do not daily give thanks for2. Cornucopia 29
our cassette players and genuflect in front of our CD collections. We do not reflect that
they have brought us to the limit of human felicity.
The technological inventions of the past century have transformed experiences that were
rare and valued luxuries—available only to a rich few at great expense at relatively rare
performances of the symphony or the opera—into features of modern life that we take for
granted. Bellamy's view of us might be somewhat analogous to our view of a civilization
in which everyone had several boxes of gem-quality diamonds sitting in their basement,
ignored because no one could find a use for them, and in which no one thought of these
boxes as in any way interesting.
If you asked Edward Bellamy--or any other nineteenth-century or earlier sketcher of
utopias--whether we here today have the knowledge of technology and of productive
organization needed to provide at least the material abundance needed to build a utopia,
they would all say 'of course. "And they would in turn ask of us why we do not recognize
that those of us in the middle and upper classes of the industrial economies have, in
material well-being at least, reached the limit of human felicity.
B.Economic Growth in Long-Run Perspective2. Cornucopia 30
1.Before and Since the Commercial Revolution
Theworld as a whole has not had the sixteen-fold multiplication of its material prosperity
that our third-millennium middle-class standpoint sees in the United States over the past
century. It is a mistake to claim that growth and development over the course of the past
century has been confined to the United States, or to the United States and western
Europe, or to the United States, western Europe, and Japan. It is true that only twelve
percent of the worlds population lives in countries where GDP per capita at the start of
the third millennium is more than $20,000 per year: the world distribution of income today
is skew to a remarkable extent.
But comparing cross-national estimates of material productivity measured at exchange
rates that equalize purchasing power across countries to our guesses about the pace of
long-term economic growth above suggests that the average inhabitant of Thailand of
Tunisia today has three times the productive potential of the average inhabitant of the
United States in 1900; and the average inhabitant of Argentina, Botswana, Uruguay, or
Mexico has five times the material productive potential of the average inhabitant of the
U.S. in 1900. (However, unequal income distributions within nations make such estimates
misleading as guides to economic welfare, even leaving aside the heroic and shaky
assumption that comparisons across countries today can be related to comparisons across
time within a country.)2. Cornucopia 31
Perhaps 36% of the world's population in 2000 lives in a country with a level of material
output per capita less than that of the United States in 1900. But even in such poor
countries today, most inhabitants are living much better than their predecessors. Angus
Maddison estimates that world per capita GDP at the end of the twentieth century is five
times what it was at the century's start--and Maddison's estimates are (in concept at least)
Laspeyres estimates that make insufficient allowance for technological change and the
invention of new commodities.26 Making half as great an allowance for the impact of new
26
SeeAngus Maddison (1995),Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD: xxxx).
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commodities and technologies produces an estimate of a ninefold increase in world GDP
per capita over the twentieth century.
Thus not just in the United States, but worldwide, the twentieth century is unique in its
pace of economic growth. Such rapid growth in standards of living has never been seen
before, anywhere. The nineteenth century saw perhaps a doubling of measured material
standards of living in the United States—perhaps a tripling once proper account is taken
of the impact of new technologies like the railroad and the telegraph, and the expanded
range of technological capabilities.27 Nineteenth century growth was itself remarkably fast:
people christened the nineteenth century the "industrial revolution" because it was
remarkable compared to what had happened before. And before the nineteenth century
growth was even slower. The standard of living in the Netherlands, probably the richest
economy in the world at the end of the eighteenth century, might (or might not) have been
some fifty percent higher than it had been three centuries before, at the time of the
Renaissance.28
27Theeffects of new technologies are likely to have been less in the nineteenth century because of a
slower overall pace of teclmological change, and because a larger share of nineteenth-century
technological change took the form of new types of capital goods that made production easier but did not
greatly change people's style of life. The spinning jenny and the power loom made cloth cheap: but it was
still the same cloth. More nineteenth century inventions were like the differential gear, the locomotive, the
dynamo, the combine harvester, the hydraulic jack, the telegraph, or nitroglycerine; fewer were like
canned food, the gas stove, the bicycle, kerosene, or linoleum. See Smithsonian Timeline of Inventions.
The standard source is—and by virtue of his industry and thoroughness will long remain—Angus
Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD: 9264145494). See also his
19 Phases of Capitalist Development (New York: Oxford: 0198284519), and Paul Bairoch's speculative
(but I have no better speculations) "Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Industrial
Revolution," in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Lëvy-Leboyer, eds. (1981), Disparities in Economic
Development since the Industrial Revolution (London: Macmillan).
28Jande Vries and Ad van der Woude (1997), The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 0521578256).2. Cornucopia 33
[Figure: the countryside:RomanItaly, circa 0; Netherlands, circa 1500; U.s.
midwest, circa 1900; U.S. midwest, today]
Andbeforethat? Between the invention of agriculture and the commercial revolution that
marked the end of the middle ages, wealth and technology developed slowly indeed.
Medieval historians speak of centuries and half-millennia when they speak of thepace at
which key inventions like the watermill, or the heavy plow, or the horse collar diffused
across the landscape. And improvements in technology relatively quickly led to increases
in population, until the human population once again reached a new Malthusian steady
state in which births were held in checks by death. For most of human history before the
industrial revolution, increases in technological capability led to increases in the population
that could be supported on a given natural resource base, with little ifany appearing as an
improvement in the median standard of living.29
So slow was the pace of change that people, or at least aristocratic intellectuals, could
think of their predecessors of a thousand years before or more as effectively their
contemporaries. And they were not far wrong. Marcus Tullius Cicero, a Roman aristocrat
and politician of the generation before the Emperor Augustus, might have felt more or less
at home in the company of Virginia planter Thomas Jefferson. The slaves outsidegrew
different crops. The plows were better in Jefferson's time. Sailing ships were much
improved. But these might have been insufficient to create a sense of a qualitative change
29Orso I read the history at least. See Abbott P. Usher (1922), A History of Mechanical Inventions (New
York: Dover: 048625593X); Michael Kremer (1993), "Population Growth and Technological Change:
One Million B.C. to 1990," Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:3 (August),pp. 681-716; Massimo Livi-
Bacci (1992), The Concise History of World Population (London: Blackwell: 0631204555).2. Cornucopia 34
in the order of life for the elite. Andatbottom being a slave of Thomas Jefferson was
probably a lot like being a slave of Marcus Tullius Cicero.3°
IlFigure:Slavesat Monticello—Slaves working the fields of ancient Rome]
Overall, however, the differences in standards of living and in technologies used to
manipulate the world were small, or at least "small" relative to the pace of change in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even the first century of the industrial revolution
produced more "improvements" than "revolutions" in standards of living. With the
railroad and the spinning and weaving of textiles as very important exceptions, most
innovations during the first century or so of the industrial revolution proper were
innovations in transportation, in how goods were produced, and in new kinds of capital
but not consumer goods. Improvements in productivity--in the first half of the nineteenth
century at least--were concentrated in a few relatively narrow sectors rather than spread
throughout the economy.3'
°
SeeMoses Finley (1985), The Ancient Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press:
0520024362). One change between his day and Thomas Jefferson's might well have struck Cicero as
amazing and wonderful: printing. Printing technology might have been enough to create a sense of a
qualitative change in the order of life. For Cicero acquiring one copy of one book involved two months'
worth of copying labor by a literate slave, an amount of labor that we would value at perhaps $4,000
dollars compared to the $10 price of a trade paperback book today; we today find the real price of books in
terms of human labor to be 1/400 of what it was for Cicero, and even in Jefferson's day the real price of
books had already fallen to perhaps 1/50 of what it had been at the beginning of the Roman Empire. See
Elizabeth Eisenstcin (1993), The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press: 0521447704). Printing made possible macrohistorical events like the Refonnation and
the Scientific Revolution. It also made it possible for a person to earn a living as an author: see Lisa
Jardine (1995), Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of Charisma in Print (Princeton: Princeton
University Press: 0691001 57)Q. And it made it possible for individuals to own enough books to construct
their own virtual reality chamber. See Niccolo Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori, December 10, 1515, in
James Atkinson, ed. (1996), Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal Correspondence (David Sices,
trans.) (Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press: 0875802109).
'
SoC. Knick Harley and N.F,R. Crafts have persuaded economic historians. See N.F.R. Crafts (1985),
British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press:2. Cornucopia 35
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Soslowwasthe paceofimprovement that literaryintellectualsin the first half of the
nineteenth century debatedwhetherthisindustrialrevolution wasworthwhile.Was it an
improvementor adegenerationin the standard of living? And opinions were genuinely
0198730675). Peter Temin, however, has cast some significant doubt on this conclusion. See Tcmin's
1997 "Two Views of the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Economic History 57:1 (March),pp. 63-82.2. Cornucopia 36
divided, with as optimistic a liberal as John Stuart Mill coming down on the "pessimist"
side as late as the end of the 1840s.32 The figure above shows—approximately—the
relative pace of economic growth in productivity levels and material wealth for the world
as a whole over the past ten centuries. The estimates are rough and approximate only. But
the figure does not do violence to the qualitativepictureof relative rates of economic
growth over the past ten centuries. And in the leading-edge economies of Europe (plus the
European-settled North American economies) the acceleration of growth into the
twentieth century was an order of magnitude faster still.
2.Massive and colossal productive forces
In1848, in the middle of the nineteenth century, before the industrial revolution proper
had spread far from its original homes in Belgium and in the British midlands, a young
German philosopher-turned-political activist marveled at the extraordinary pace of
economic growth in his day. He saw it as a new historical epoch that was only a century
old, and yet was opening wide the door to utopia. He saw the epoch as equivalent to that
of Prometheus, the mythological Greek demigod who defied the chief god Zeus, brought
knowledge of fire to humanity, and transformed humanity's condition.
32
SeeGeorge Boyer (1998), "The Communist Manifesto in Historical Perspective," Journal of Economic
Perspectives. The fact thattherecan be a debate over whether the median standard of living rose or fell in
the first half of the nineteenth century tells us that the pace of economic growth then must have been
much slower than is has been since, either in Britain or elsewhere. There is no "standard of living debate"
for the late nineteenth-century U.S., for mid twentieth-century Italy, or for late twentieth-century South
Korea.2. Cornucopia 37
The young Karl Marx wrote that the economically ruling class—the capitalist class, the
entrepreneurial class, the business class, the bourgeoisie—of this epoch was:
• the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished
wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic
cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses
of nations and crusades....
[It has], during its rule of scarce one hundred years...created more massive and
more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. The
subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, the application of chemistry to
industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, the railways, electric telegraphs, the
clearing of entire continents for cultivation, the canalization of rivers, the conjuring
of entire populations out of the ground—what earlier century had even a
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?
Karl Marx was dumbfounded at the pace of the economic transition he saw around him in
the middle of the nineteenth century. Yet compared to the pace of economic growth in the2. Cornucopia 38
twentieth century, allothercenturies—even the nineteenth century that so impressed Karl
Marx—were standing still.33
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848), Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Robert Tucker, ed., The
Marx-En gels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton: 039309040)9.2. Cornucopia 12. Cornucopia 2
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1973 37816.895449538.78862. Cornucopia 10
197436734.7731 47642.4325
197537890.2094 48651.992
1976 39011.196849592.9508
1977 40409.68 50859.6237
1978 40731.1338 50754.118
1979 40002.0212 49349.616
1980 40100.7181 48979.1276
1981 38843.8377 46971.8951
1982 39978.6136 47863.0903
1983 42418.325 50278.6464
1984 43561.7239 51120.1566
1985 44521.6507 51726.7783
1986 45741.3382 52615.0628
1987 47182.5394 53732.8151
1988 48669.1495 54874.3128
1989 50009.1401 55824.1065
1990 50292.7046 55582.0345
1991 49767.1832 54453.972
1992 51036.1516 55286.803
1993 52133.6301 55913.7448
1994 53879.3975 57211.1134
1995 55038.0171 57859.8766
1996 56826.0844 59145.2009
1997 58955.9571 60751.4333
1998 60590.2787 61814.2835
1999 63147.8619 63782.5085
2000 65034.965 65034.965